Clerical Exemption in Canon Law from Gratian to the Decretals anchorites, monks, and nuns were subject to the audientia episcopalis, 16 and lay people were subject to its jurisdiction in religious matters. Episcopal jurisdiction was seen as part of the imperial system of law; bishops co-operated with their secular counterparts in dispensing justice, although that did not make them civil judges. 17 On the other hand, breaches of the public (criminal) laws were determined by the public judges according to those laws, but severe penalties could not be imposed on ordained clerics until the bishop had deprived them of their clerical status.
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Preserved and transmitted in the enucleated compilations which constituted the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus iuris, these are the deep roots of the privilegium fori or ›privilege of the forum/court‹, which protected clerics and religious from secular judgment in the Middle Ages. The Parisian theologian Hugh of St-Victor explained its practical effects in his treatise on the sacraments in the mid-1130s: 19 For example, a secular judge is allowed to lay hands on a layperson if he sins, not on a cleric.
[…] Secular matters should be examined by the secular power; spiritual and ecclesiastical matters by the spiritual power. […] In regard to the person, then, justice is violated if a secular judge lays hands on an ecclesiastical person.
The phrase ›lay hands on (manum mittere)‹ carried special significance. It denoted a physical assault on the protected body of the cleric, here extended to all ›ecclesiastical persons‹, including monks and nuns, but it did not include civil procedures, in which there was no arrest, no seizure, and no imprisonment pending trial.
As the leading theologian of his generation, Hugh's teaching reached a wide audience, but his contemporary, Master Gratian, the founder of the school of canon law in Bologna, provided a much more comprehensive examination of the privilegium fori in his ground-breaking Concordia discordatium canonum (Concordance of discordant canons), popularly known as the Decretum (vulgate edition, 1140-1145) . This was a systematic compilation of ecclesiastical law, in three books, designed to underpin the study and application of the law of the Western Church. 20 Its defining features were its inclusion of segments of Justinianic law, especially relating to judicial process, and its adoption, particularly in Part II, of the dialectical technique of argumentation, in which authorities were organized pro and contra around thirty-six major cases, including, for example, marriage (causae 27-36). Each case was divided into problems (questiones), in which the relevant authorities were set out in individual segments (capitula), and accompanied by the Master's own dicta (pronouncements), which attempted to resolve any contradictions. No fewer than fifty chapters in Causa 11, questio 1 deal with the matter of clerical immunity. 21 Broadly, and based on the concept that each has his own court (forum), Gratian assembled the canons to demonstrate that clergy and laity belonged to separate but not mutually exclusive jurisdictions. In a (civil) dispute between a lay person and a cleric, or vice versa, the dispute should be determined in the court of the defendant according to the Roman legal principle that the plaintiff should seek redress in the defendant's court (actor forum rei sequatur). 22 This meant that clergy should not be summoned before lay courts either by other clergy or by laymen; 23 but where a cleric wished to pursue a layman in a civil action, he had to sue in the layman's court. Gratian stated the principle of clerical judicial privilege trenchantly in his assertion before chapter 32, which concludes: 24 The drawing of a cleric before a civil judge is prohibited by the sacred canons and the external (forensibus = secular) laws, both in civil and in criminal cases.
-a conclusion most memorably supported in c.5 §1 by an extraordinary declaration of the judicial immunity of Christian bishops attributed to the emperor Constantine at the Council of Nicaea (325): »You can be judged by no-one, because we reserve you for the judgment of God alone.‹ 25 The same quotation appears later in the Decretum in a passage attributed to ›Pope Melciades‹ (Melitiades 311-314), where it is followed by an even more extravagant statement of episcopal privilege: »For you have been called gods, and therefore you cannot be judged by men.« 26 Although derived from the ninth-century Pseudo-Isidore (in which This broad consensus, however, was disturbed by four canons among the 50 arrayed in Causa 11, questio 1, which recorded what appeared to be forms of traditio curie, in which clerics were stripped of their immunity and transferred to another (secular?) court for punishment.
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The first, the ›Pius canon‹, Si quis sacerdotum, attributed to ›Pope Pius‹, reads, 30 If any priest or any other cleric is disobedient to his bishop, or plots against him, or inflicts insult, false accusation, or abuse upon him, and can be convicted of it, as soon as he is deposed he is to be handed over to the curia (mox depositus curiae tradatur) and receive retribution for his wrongful act (et recipiat quod inique gessit) (Coloss. 3: 25) .
The second, the ›Fabian canon‹, Statuimus, reads, We decree that if any cleric is rebellious or plots against his bishop, having been removed from the clergy (submotus a clero) in the presence of the court (iudicium), let him be handed over to the curia (curiae tradatur), which he is to serve all the days of his life, and remain defamed without hope of restoration (et infamis absque ulla spe restitutionis permaneat).
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Both seem clear enough: in cases of violent rebellion against episcopal authority, a bishop can degrade the cleric and transfer him to a secular court for punishment. Unfortunately, neither text is what it appears to be. Far from being authentic decrees of Popes Pius I (c.AD 140-154) and Fabian (AD 236-250), the canons were ›confected‹ in northern France in the ninth century and transmitted in the compilation which historians have dubbed PseudoIsidore, because it was attributed to a fictitious ›Isidorus Mercator‹. This ›Isidorus‹, in turn, was easily confused with the real Isidore of Seville (c.560-636), author of the Etymologiae, the early medieval equivalent of a general encyclopaedia, and so carried the authority of a great name. 33 The compilers' aim was to protect bishops and other ecclesias tical persons and institutions from secular abuse and confirm episcopal authority with an assemblage of authentic ancient canons, augmented by cleverly confected ›judg-ments‹ attributed to early popes and councils. Set in the context and purpose of their fabrication, it is highly unlikely that they were intended to subject priests and clerics to lay judgment and/or punishment. The key to understanding these texts is the interpretation of the Latin noun curia. This word had a wide lexical range in the Middle Ages. Niermeyer's dictionary of medieval Latin, for example, lists 21 mean ings, ranging from law-court/tribunal to assembly, household, courtyard, and prison. 34 In the ›Fabian canon‹, certainly, curia implies something different from a judicial forum. Having been ›removed from the clergy in the presence of the (bishop's) court (iudicium)‹, the condemned cleric was to be handed over to the curia, ›there to serve all the days of his life‹. This implies transfer, not to another, possibly lay, court but to a form of servitude, in the bishop's household or administration, probably modelled on late Roman curial status, which itself was a form of enforced service of the local municipal authority (curia), originally imposed on certain categories of secular malefactors. 35 A decree of the emperors Arcadius,
Honorius and Theodosius at the end of the fourth century, transmitted in the Theodosian Code (438), had imposed such curial service as a penalty for degraded or renegade clergy:
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Let the curia immediately claim for itself … any cleric whom the bishop judges unworthy of his office and segregates from the service of the Church […] . 32 Fuhrmann, Einfluss und Verbreitung, i, [193] [194] [195] [196] Fuhrmann, It is likely that the forgers of the Pius and Fabian canons had this decree in mind when they constructed their own papal variant, but their curia was the curia episcopalis not the secular curia. In both cases, the convicted cleric is reduced to a form of penitential servitude in the bishop's household. The question of secular judgment or penalty did not arise.
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Support for this interpretation is found in the judgment given by Pope Gregory VII in a council in Rome (1079) against the canons of Lucca cathedral, who had rebelled against Bishop Anselm (1071, 1073-1083). Gregory's judgment was based on the authority of the Fabian canon in its original form (without the word depositus) 38 and another Carolingian confection ascribed to ›Pope Stephen‹, which said much the same thing, 39 quoted verbatim.
The Luccesi canons were excommunicated and deprived of office and benefice
40
; the Life of St Anselm of Lucca claimed that Countess Matilda of Tuscany, »calling them slaves, summoned them to the service of the curia.« 41 The judgment had no effect, but its interpretation of the Fabian canon is important in the present context. Gratian was not unaware of the non-judicial meaning of curia, having presented a string of genuine canons from early popes (Innocent I 401-417, Gelasius I 492-496, Gregory I 590-604) which stated that men assigned to public administrative service (curiales) were debarred from sacred orders, 42 but he did not recognize that the curia in the ›Pius‹ and ›Fabian‹ canons described a similar administrative institution. Reading it to mean (secular) court, he confidently declared at the end of his summary, following Questio 1, chapter 30, that:
In a criminal case no cleric is to be produced before a civil judge, except with the consent of his bishop, as, for example, when they (sic) are found incorrigible, and then, having been deprived of office, they are handed over to the curia, as Pope Fabian affirms, 43 followed by the Fabian canon (c.31). The third case, the so-called ›Gregorian‹ canon, attributed in Gratian's Decretum to Pope Gregory I (590-604), was a genuine letter of the sixth-century Pope Pelagius I (555/1-560/1) addressed to the Byzantine general Narses, then controlling northern Italy in the aftermath of the Gothic wars launched by Emperor Justinian. The key passage read, 44 We request that you send the pseudo-bishop Paul of Aquileia and the bishop of Milan to the most merciful prince under appropriate guard, so that […] [each] may be subject to the punishment of the canons.
This also related to a form of ›handing over‹, but it was not for secular judgment or secular punishment. The two bishops were to be transferred to Constantinople where the emperor (Justinian) would impose the appropriate canonical penalty on them. 45 Since both the identity of the pope and the context were unknown to Gratian, he could be forgiven for interpreting it to mean, as he proclaimed in the heading, that »Those whom the Church cannot correct may be corrected by princes,« 46 although the phrase »according to the canons« might have given him pause. The fourth example derives from a novella of Emperor Justinian. 47 As transmitted by Gratian, its key clause reads:
48
If a case concerning a criminal matter arises, competent [judges] may, when required, impose a judgment consonant with the laws, but in such a way that the discussion of the case should not exceed two months from its formal presentation [...] Even so, »A cleric may not be punished unless having been found guilty he is deprived of the priesthood or clerical honour by his bishop.« This imperial decree subjected clerics accused of secular crime to secular process, but the cleric could not be punished -that is, subjected to the penalties of the public law -unless he was deprived of his clerical status after his guilt had been proved and the praeses had determined that it merited the punishment of the leges. Until then, his person was sacrosanct. After supporting this imperial constitution with canons from the early Church councils of Chalcedon (451) Bishops and priests cannot for any case be accused before a secular judge, because secular judges cannot judge them […] . What therefore is to be done? Let the cleric or bishop be summoned before the ecclesiastical judge, and after he has been convicted of a secular crime by lawful proof, if the crime is particularly terrible, let him be stripped of the dignity of his office and then released to be punished by the secular judge according to the criminal laws (a seculari iudice secundum leges publicas puniendus).
To Gratian's test of ›incorrigibility‹, Rufinus added the test of grievous criminality as grounds for exposing clerics to secular punishment, and he very much clarified the language. The ambiguous curia is dropped in favour of ›secular‹ and ›ecclesiastical‹ judges.
Outside the classroom, bishops began to raise questions about the application of the privilegium fori to concrete problems in their own dioceses, to which popes replied on an ad hoc basis. Their responses show the papal Curia struggling to maintain the principle of clerical immunity while allowing that the protection could be withdrawn or withheld in certain situations. This adaptation can be traced through the pontificates of five popes (Eugenius III, Lucius III, Urban III, Celestine III, and Innocent III), whose responsa helped to form the new ›decretal law‹ on clerical privilege in the Liber Extra, also known as the Gregorian Decretals. We do not command that clerics who, having abandoned their order, habit, and office, live in apostasy like laymen, should be freed by ecclesiastical censure if they are held after being seized in the commission of crimes.
The ›censure‹ to which Eugenius referred was canon 15 of the Second Lateran Council (1139), a canon known by its opening words as Si quis suadente, which had imposed automatic excommunication on all who laid violent hands on clerics or monks, a sentence which could not be lifted by the diocesan bishop, except at the point of death, until the delinquent had gone in person to the Apostolic See. 55 Eugenius implied that lapsed clerics who committed crimes were not protected by Si quis suadente, on the unspoken principle that »he who abuses a privilege deserves to lose it.« 56 Similarly, Eugenius instructed Bishop Jocelin to forbid his clerks to act as estate managers for laypersons: if they did, and were seized for fraud in a financial matter, it was improper that they should be protected by the Church in which they had created scandal. 57 In other words, they should not be allowed to appeal to Si quis suadente if they were suspected of misappropriation. These replies should be seen in the context of the civil war in England (1138/1139-54) between King Stephen and the ›Empress‹ Matilda, which was causing localized breakdowns in law and order. Jocelin of Salisbury had sought special authority to deal with clerical criminals (malefactores) in his diocese, and the full text of the pope's response, which was not transmitted in the canonical tradition, makes it clear that Eugenius was authorizing exceptional action for exceptional cases. Therefore, desiring to have regard for the peace and tranquillity [of your diocese], we order you to restrain your criminals with appropriate punishment, and we are prepared to subject them to more severe penalty if they do not come to their senses and desist from their depravity‹.
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What that ›more severe penalty‹ may have been is uncertain, but it may have implied a willingness to abandon such violent men to the tender mercies of the secular power if they remained recalcitrant. It is unlikely, however, that he contemplated a general withdrawal of the privilegium fori. Indeed, earlier in the same year (9 June 1146), in a letter to Bishop Tebaldo of Verona (1135-1157), Eugenius had condemned the exercise of disciplinary power over delinquent clerics by laymen. After stating the principle that ›clerical affairs and the discipline of clerks belong to bishops and their officials‹, the pope condemned the practice of laymen ›seizing and correcting‹ (distringere et corrigere) clerics who committed sexual sins (si carnaliter peccaverint) and mandated the bishop to restrain them by ecclesiastical censure. 59 Although this letter survives only in a single copy made in Verona, the key segments of the more ambiguous Salisbury consultation were copied into collections of decretal letters in England and then transmitted to Continental collectors, eventually becoming part of the formal law studied in Bologna, 60 and so helped to consolidate Gratian's reading of the earlier tradition. Meanwhile, the question of privilegium fori blew up in a big way in England eighteen years later (1164), when King Henry II decreed in clause 3 of a set of royal edicts known from where they were issued as the ›Constitutions of Clarendon‹ that: 61 Clerks charged and accused of any matter shall … come before the king's court to answer there concerning matters which shall seem to the king's court to be answerable there, and before the ecclesiastical court for what seems to be answerable there, but in such a way that the king's justice shall send to the court of holy Church to see on what ground (qua ratione) the case is there tried. And if the clerk shall be convicted or shall confess, the Church ought no longer to protect him.
How far Henry's formulation was compatible with the canon law is a moot point: note its broad reach -»accused of any matter…concerning any matters which shall seem to the king's court to be answerable there« -and the total absence of episcopal discretion. Equally moot is its accuracy as a statement of English customary law, 62 but the matter was settled, broadly in the Church's favour in 1175/1176, when Henry II reached a compromise following negotiation with Pope Alexander III's legate, Hugh Pierleone:
We have conceded … that a clerk shall not in future be drawn in his own person before a secular judge for any criminal matter (de aliquo criminali), or for any trespass (de aliquo forifacto), except the trespass of my forest, and except for lay fee for which lay service is owed to me or to another secular lord.
Breach of the forest law was a significant exception, 63 since its penalties could be brutal, 64 but the main principle of clerical exemption from secular punishment held for criminal cases throughout the Middle Ages in England, with some significant modifications, and was not finally abolished until 1827. Generally speaking, a cleric who pleaded clergy was tried, and then released to the bishop's proctor, with notification of the verdict for the bishop's information. If he had been acquitted, there was nothing further to do; if he had been convicted, he could try to purge himself in the bishop's court; if he failed, he would be imprisoned for life in an ecclesiastical prison. 65 The question of ordeal did not arise, since that form of proof was abolished in England in 1219 in the wake of the Fourth Lateran Council's withdrawal of ecclesiastical involvement in the process in 1215. 66 The number of clerics involved seems to have been small and mostly confined to the category of clerks who had received the tonsure as a mark of their clerical status but had not been promoted to even the lowest clerical order, 67 and the majority were found not guilty. Generally speaking, the process worked well - Although Pope Lucius III (1181-1185) maintained the principle when he instructed the arch bishop of Esztergom that clerics could be judged only by ecclesiastical judges, even if local custom held to the contrary in respect of thieves, 74 he recognized that there were circum stances in which it was necessary for the Church to rely on secular force in its own defence. The catalyst was the forgery of papal letters that was reported to Lucius in 1185. 68 Helmholz, Ius Commune in England, 190. 69 Gratian, C.11 q.1 cc.5, 12, 14, 20, and 22. William de Turba of Norwich to deprive the priest who had forged (falsavit) the papal letters which the bishop had sent to the Curia and, »if he can be found«, place him in »some monastery of strict religion« (aliquod monasterium districte religionis) to suffer the penalty for so grave a crime, so that others may be deterred. If any others are found, the bishop can hold them in the strictest custody (artissime custodie), without right of appeal, »until you receive an apostolic mandate on the matter«.
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At a time when ecclesiastical rights and privileges as well as much of the practice and jurisprudence of the Latin Church were being shaped by reliance on papal privileges and judicial letters (decretales), the forgery or falsification of papal documents presented a major problem, and popes from Lucius III (1181-1185) onwards were forced to authorise increasing ly strong actions to punish and deter. Responding to a report from Archbishop Walter of Rouen that persons had been discovered forging litteras apostolicas in the lands of the English king (Henry II), Lucius authorized the archbishop in Improba pestis falsitatis (a letter issued from Verona, 16 October 1185), to deprive the guilty clerics of their order and benefice and to keep them in close custody until the pope issued further instructions, while any laymen should be handed over to the king for judgment, »so that this pestilence which is recognized as pernicious by everyone may be condemned by both ecclesiastical and secular judgment, together with its authors«. 79 The two powers were to collaborate in the eradication of the scourge of forgery, which affected both jurisdictions. Although important as evidence of curial attitude to forgery, this letter had little long-term impact, since it was not included in the Liber Extra. It was another shocking case of forgery, discovered by the same archbishop of Rouen, which precipitated the fateful step of exposing clerical criminals to a form of punishment similar to that imposed on laymen, although in this instance, it was a prelate who imposed it. When Archbishop Walter asked what should be done with clerics who had forged the seal of King Philip II of France, Pope Urban III (1185-1187) replied in the decretal Ad audientiam that they should not lose a membrum (which could mean castration), nor should he inflict a corporal penalty that might endanger life. Instead, after degrading them, he should have them branded as forgers and compelled to abjure the province. 80 It is highly likely that Walter had reported the severe penalties, then current practice in the Anglo-Norman realm, where not only counterfeiters of coin but also those found with false money in their possession risked castration and the loss of their right hands. 81 Urban III's solution -degradation, branding, and expulsion from the province (Normandy) -seems to me to be an echo of the Roman Lex Cornelia de falsis, which prescribed death for slaves and deportation for everyone else.
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But the pope stopped short of transferring the guilty clerics to the secular jurisdiction for punish ment. That step was taken, with considerable reluctance, by Pope Celestine III in Cum non ab homine, which instructed Archbishop Eirik of Nidaros in 1191-1192 that neither kings nor any secular person could judge clerics ›apprehended for robbery, homicide, perjury, or any other crimes‹. Instead they should be arraigned, tried, and deposed by their bishops, and if they remained defiant and incorrigible after excommunication and anathema, since the Church had nothing further that it could do, they could be restrained by the secular power »by exile or any other lawful penalty« 83 -a phrase which excluded mutilation or death. The test for Celestine, as it had been for Gratian and his principal commentators, including Rufinus, 84 was incorrigibility, since the Church has nothing further (cum ecclesia non habeat ultra). A cleric who has been degraded for this (forgery) or any other grave crime (grave flagitium), not merely worthy of condemnation (damnabile) but pernicious (damnosum), is then brought to the secular court (forum) as one stripped of his clerical privilege, when he is cast out of the ecclesiastical forum; his degradation must be conducted in the presence of the secular power, which must be notified in advance so that it can take the degraded cleric into its forum, and he is thus understood to be surrendered to the secular court. Nevertheless, the Church should intercede effectively (efficaciter) on his behalf so that the sentence does not involve the danger of death (periculum mortis).
In this particular case, Innocent directed that the cleric was to be confined in prison for life, but he extended the application of traditio curie to other grave and pernicious crimes. Here he was almost certainly following the example of Lucius III's constitution, Ad abolendam, issued at Verona in 1184, which decreed that degraded and excommunicated heretic clerks should be handed over to the secular authorities to receive due punishment (animadversione debita), unless they immediately repudiated their heresy and did penance. The need to provide secure detention for aggressive clerics also provided further grounds for relaxing the reach of Si quis suadente. In 1203 Innocent III replied to a consultation from Archbishop Anders Sunesen of Lund who asked what should be done with clerics who were so violent that they could not safely be placed in monasteries. Innocent instructed that bishops must place them in secure detention (sub arcta custodia detinere, qui, quum sint incorrigibiles, nec in monasteriis valeant custodiri), »since it is in the public interest that crimes do not remain unpunished.« 99 On the question of their capture, laymen who acted on instructions from bishops in the arrest of such men did not incur the sanction of the canon, but could seize them, even violently, and convey them to (ecclesiastical) judgment, as long as it was at the command of prelates, to whose jurisdiction the punishment of criminous clerics belonged, and the violence was proportionate to the resistance offered. 100 The solution in Denmark, as indeed it was in contemporary England, was close collaboration between the lay power and the Church in the apprehension and punishment of dangerous clerics: secular coercive power was harnessed to the disciplinary authority of the Church, but bishops bore the burden of providing the secure detention deemed necessary. There remained the problem of renegade clerics who claimed immunity. In 1213, Count Ferdinand of Flanders and the dowager Countess Matilda complained to Innocent III about men who cut their hair and claimed clerical privilege when they were arrested for crimes, even though nothing in their earlier dress or occupation suggested that they were clerics. Writing to the three Flemish bishops (Thérouanne, Arras, Tournai), Innocent quoted the ancient adage that »he who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose the privilege«, 101 reinforced by a favourite maxim of his own, that »he who breaks the law invokes its aid in vain«, 102 and ordered, that »if, after three warnings, such men refuse to mend their ways, they should be excluded from the immunity established for the protection of clerics and control of lay violence.« 103 The story of clerical exemption is typical of the way in which theoretical principles were progressively refined in the eighty years following Gratian's completion of the Decretum c.1141-1145, through a process of repeated consultation between regional prelates and the papacy. 104 Confronted by the realities of life outside the classroom, broad statements of clerical privilege and exemption gave way to recognition that outrageous behaviour, or out and out apostasy, undermined the privileges conferred by religious profession and ordination. As early as 1146 Eugenius III had instructed an English bishop to withdraw the protection of Si quis suadente from men who had abandoned their calling, and his successors were prepared to do likewise, as long as the Church retained the right to maintain or withhold the privilege.
